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11 
Response 
Speaking of Silence: 
A Reply to Making Defendants Speak 
Donald P. Judges† and Stephen J. Cribari†† 
In an article recently appearing in the Minnesota Law Re-
view, Ted Sampsell-Jones argues that defendants should be 
“made” to testify at criminal trials.1 The article’s primary ra-
tionale is that defendants are an informational resource whose 
testimony is necessary to the fact-finding process.2 The article 
also proposes that defendants actually will benefit from the re-
sulting diminution in defense counsel’s role at trial.3 
The key move in Sampsell-Jones’s article is not directly to 
challenge the norms underlying defendants’ rights, to which it 
gives scant attention and minimal content. Rather, it is to ar-
gue that, because government “neutrality between testimony 
and silence” is not possible, desirable, or constitutionally re-
quired,4 the question becomes “whether the current set of rules 
 
†  E.J. Ball Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Clinical Psycholo-
gy at the University of Arkansas.  
†† Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School and Visit-
ing Professor of Law at the University of St. Thomas School of Law. The au-
thors wish to thank Professors Stephen Sheppard and Brian Gallini for their 
comments. Thanks also to Jason Auer and Aaron McClintock for their re-
search assistance. Copyright © 2009 by Donald P. Judges and Stephen J. Cri-
bari. 
 1. Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1327, 1329 (2009). For a similar analysis, see Jeffery Bellin, Improving the Re-
liability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules that Encourage Defendants to 
Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008). 
 2. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1330–34. 
 3. Id. at 1336.  
 4. Id. at 1327. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, the case cited in support of this 
proposition, involved a habeas challenge to a higher sentence imposed by a 
jury after a successful appeal. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). There the Court explicitly 
reaffirmed “the underlying rationale” of North Carolina v. Pearce, that due 
process prohibits the imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial “as punish-
ment” for the exercise of the right of appeal or collateral review. See Chaffin, 
412 U.S. at 18 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)). Chaffin 
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creates the proper mix of incentives and disincentives” in a “ze-
ro-sum game” between the constitutional right to testify on one 
side of the ledger and the constitutional right to remain silent 
on the other.5 The article proposes two sets of reforms to “make 
defendants speak.” To “punish” defendants more for refusing to 
testify, it would overrule the prohibition, set out in Griffin v. 
California,6 on adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence in 
a criminal proceeding.7 To “reward” them for testifying, it pro-
poses two measures. The first would abandon the five-factor ba-
lancing test of Gordon v. United States,8 which has guided ad-
missibility under Rule 609(a)(1)9 of prior felony convictions as 
impeachment evidence against defendants who testify in their 
own criminal trials.10 The second would abolish perjury en-
hancements under the Sentencing Guidelines’11 obstruction-of-
justice provision for defendants who testify falsely under 
oath.12 
Making Defendants Speak takes immediate aim at Griffin, 
which it finds flawed as a matter of theory, constitutional text, 
history, and policy; but its ultimate target is the right to re-
main silent at trial.13 We therefore concentrate most of our at-
 
distinguishes between judicial and jury sentencing in addressing the risk of 
vindictiveness because the Court saw the jury as presenting less risk, in part 
because the jury is unlikely to be in a position to seek or to desire to punish a 
defendant for the exercise of the right. See id. at 26–27. The Court did not en-
dorse but instead explicitly rejected (once again) the proposition that the state 
may deliberately seek to punish a defendant for exercising a constitutional 
right. See id. at 35.  
 5. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1328. 
 6. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
 7. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1339–58. Griffin held that the Fifth 
Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s si-
lence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” 380 
U.S. at 615. Most sources, including the Supreme Court, refer to the Griffin 
principle as a prohibition on adverse or negative inference from the defen-
dant’s silence. E.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327–30 (1999). It 
would be more correct grammatically to state the Griffin rule as a prohibition 
on adverse implication rather than on adverse inference. Prosecutors and 
judges imply (or are explicit), juries infer. The term “no-adverse-inference in-
struction to the jury” thus reflects correct usage. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 
U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (using the term). For the sake of convenience, however, 
we simply adopt the more common terminology in referring broadly to Griffin.  
 8. 383 F.2d 936, 939–41 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
 10. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1358–67. 
 11. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. N.4(b) (2008). 
 12. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1369–75.  
 13. Id. at 1347–49. 
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tention on a robust right to remain silent at trial. In Part I we 
argue that the right to remain silent at trial has emerged as 
part of a cluster of rights effectuating the modern “test the 
prosecution” approach to criminal procedure. The adverse infe-
rence, prohibited by Griffin, is inconsistent with that right. We 
suggest in Part II that more may be said on behalf of a robust 
right to silence, including a prohibition on adverse inferences, 
than its critics recognize. Finally, we briefly respond in Part III 
to several specific aspects of Making Defendants Speak. We 
suggest that its “zero-sum-game” perspective reflects flawed 
premises and reasoning and is more usefully regarded as a 
form of “exchange abolitionism,” the notion underlying the 
movement in England and Wales to permit adverse inferences 
from the accused’s silence. We also point out some problems in 
that article’s “accuracy,” “participation,” and “equity” argu-
ments. 
I.  MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK AS HISTORICAL 
CRITIQUE   
Making Defendants Speak’s historical critique of Griffin 
travels a well-worn path; and its challenge to Griffin’s reliance 
on unconstitutional conditions doctrine is both dependent on 
and undermined by its incentivization rationale. The article re-
cites familiar originalist arguments about the historical mean-
ing of “compulsion”—that adverse inference does not rise to the 
level of “the racks and oaths forced by the power of law.”14 Grif-
fin is wrong, this critique runs, because the adverse inference 
was not a harm the Framers’ generation would have taken se-
riously.15 The implication of this position goes beyond Griffin to 
embrace a minimalist interpretation of the Fifth Amendment 
which largely excludes the right to remain silent. Albert Al-
schuler, for example, in proposing that the United States more 
or less “follow England’s lead” and abandon both Griffin and 
Miranda, has argued on both policy and historical grounds that 
the United States Supreme Court went astray when it recog-
nized a right to remain silent in the Fifth Amendment at all, as 
opposed only to “a safeguard against torture and other forms of 
 
 14. Id. at 1347 n.106 (invoking the image of “[o]ur hardy forebears” (quot-
ing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing))). 
 15. Id. 
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coercive interrogation.”16 And it was only a matter of time be-
fore someone invoked the threat of terrorism alongside the his-
torical critique in contending for a narrow interpretation of the 
Fifth Amendment which would exclude Griffin.17 
To us, the central problem is not situating Griffin in the 
modern right to remain silent at trial. Griffin’s no-adverse-
inference rule is woven neatly into the fabric of that right. Ra-
ther, the problem is finding a robust right to remain silent in 
the Fifth Amendment. In the absence of such a right, Griffin is 
of course moot. If there is such a right, the adverse inference 
prohibited by Griffin violates it directly—quite apart from the 
“penalty” construct that opinion invokes and to which Making 
Defendants Speak devotes so much energy attempting to re-
fute—because through it the prosecution and judge in effect 
will have transformed the defendant’s silence into evidence 
against him.18 Griffin’s rule thus effectuates the Fifth Amend-
ment not only because the adverse inference seeks to induce 
forfeiture of the right to remain silent at trial, but also because 
it seeks to employ the exercise of that right as implicit testi-
monial evidence against the accused. If the Fifth Amendment 
contains a right to silence at trial, allowing an adverse infe-
rence is incompatible with that right. 
Moreover, Making Defendants Speak is at odds with itself 
even with respect to its incentivization paradigm. It criticizes 
Griffin’s inference-as-penalty reasoning on the grounds that 
 
 16. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The 
Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2667–68 (1996). Alschuler col-
lects a sample of citations to the literature debating, and mostly criticizing, 
the “right to remain silent” interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 
2647–60. For discussion of “England’s lead” in abandoning Griffin and Miran-
da, and its application to the present problem, see infra notes 144–48 and ac-
companying text. 
 17. See Lissa Griffin, Is Silence Sacred? The Vulnerability of Griffin v. 
California in a Terrorist World, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 927, 929 (2007) 
(“[T]his disfavored status is particularly dangerous in light of the modern 
threat of domestic terrorism.”). 
 18. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2628 n.11 (noting this point while ulti-
mately rejecting Griffin and this rationale); Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the 
Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Com-
pelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 503 (2005); Stephen J. Schulho-
fer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 311, 334–35 (1991); see also Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 
196 (1943) (“The claim of privilege and its allowance is properly no part of the 
evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences whatever can be legitimately 
drawn by them from the legal assertion by the witness of his constitutional 
right.” (quoting Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853))).  
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“there is no neutral, determinate way to classify what counts as 
a ‘penalty.’”19 Yet its entire project is explicitly centered around 
“punishing” the defendant for remaining silent. The article 
seems to want it both ways; it attempts to refute the theoretical 
implications of the result it seeks to accomplish in fact. If, as 
the article both assumes and advocates, abolition of Griffin 
does “punish” the defendant in fact for exercising the right to 
remain silent, then it is difficult to follow the logic by which the 
doctrinal consequences of that result may be denied.20 
In any event, the underlying problem is that an interpreta-
tion of the Fifth Amendment that includes a robust right to re-
main silent presents a constitutional conundrum. Its central 
role in today’s criminal justice system is to provide some actual 
protection for a defendant’s choice not to serve as a testimonial 
resource in prosecution against him; but making defendants 
serve as testimonial resources (including through adverse infe-
rence) is what prevailing Anglo-American criminal practice in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was largely about.21 
The difficulty is that the criminal justice systems in both Amer-
ica and England have changed dramatically in this fundamen-
tal respect, from effectively requiring defendants to speak to 
preventing them from being required to do so.22 The strict ori-
 
 19. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1343. 
 20. Making Defendants Speak’s emphasis on refuting the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine is something of a strawman. That doctrine, according to 
the source cited by Making Defendants Speak, “serves to mediate the boun-
dary between constitutional rights and government prerogatives in the areas 
of spending, licensing, and employment.” Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconsti-
tutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to 
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593 (1990). The Court 
has explicitly applied unconstitutional conditions doctrine, for example, in the 
area of land-use regulation. E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 
(1994). The nontestifying defendant, unlike the landowner in Dolan, is not be-
ing asked to give up one right in exchange for a discretionary concession, such 
as relief from otherwise applicable regulations, conferred by the government. 
Instead, the government is seeking to use the fact of the defendant’s assertion 
of the right for the very purpose the right itself otherwise would prohibit: as 
evidence of guilt. The problem here is not identifying whether the regulatory 
state has or has not actually intruded on an individual in a constitutionally 
sensitive area. Such an inquiry does not seem coherent in the context of a 
criminal prosecution. The problem is defining the limitations on the ways in 
which the government may deploy its prosecutorial resources as it does in-
trude powerfully and unmistakably on a particular individual. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. As noted below, there has been a partial retrogression in England and 
Wales (and Northern Ireland), which never constitutionalized these protec-
tions. See infra notes 144–49 and accompanying text. 
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ginalist interpretation of the Fifth Amendment rejects the con-
stitutional relevance of the law’s development since its adop-
tion, while the modern interpretation finds scant support in the 
practices and understandings prevailing in the very different 
system of its adoption.  
This Essay, rather than choosing between the Fifth 
Amendment as palimpsest or as tabula rasa, suggests instead 
that it is especially appropriate in the case of the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination to take de-
liberate account of this sea change in criminal procedure and 
thereby to give meaningful content to that protection beyond 
founding-era practice. We begin by summarizing now-familiar 
scholarship concerning the origins of the modern right to re-
main silent at trial and explaining how we believe a robust con-
ception of the right, which includes Griffin’s no-adverse-
inference rule, can be reconciled with that historical account. 
Our proposed reconciliation also suggests why Making De-
fendant Speak’s focus on the defendant’s right to testify is mis-
placed. It is true that in a literal sense the right to remain si-
lent and the right to speak at trial are antipodal in that 
exercise of one displaces the other. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the important corollary of the right to remain silent is 
generally not the defendant’s right to speak for himself at trial 
but the right to have someone else speak for him. It was the 
emergence of an active and potent role for defense counsel in 
putting the prosecution to its burden of proof through a real 
adversarial process to which more recent scholarship attributes 
the origins of the modern right to remain silent. Today, a ro-
bust right to remain silent assumes a central role in conjunc-
tion with the right to counsel and the prosecution’s burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an adversarial system. Grif-
fin, so far as it goes, reinforces that constellation of protections. 
A. THAT WAS THEN 
If relatively recent scholarship concerning the origins of 
the right to remain silent is valid, the problem with Griffin is 
not Griffin, it is the Fifth Amendment. That work has chal-
lenged the traditional view that the modern right originates in 
opposition to the oath ex officio and the Ecclesiastical courts or 
more generally to resistance to encroachment by the European 
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inquisitorial model.23 John Langbein shows that the well-
established common law practice in ordinary criminal trials in 
England—which practice the colonists brought and adapted to 
British North America and which largely persisted as a prac-
tical matter both before and immediately after the adoption of 
the Fifth Amendment24—was dominated by what he has cha-
racterized as the “accused speaks” approach to criminal trials.25 
As Langbein put it, “[t]he logic of the early modern criminal 
trial was to pressure the accused into serving as a testimonial 
resource.”26 He has argued that the modern right to remain si-
lent at trial emerged not from the constitutional struggles in 
seventeenth-century England and John Lilburne’s invocation of 
the principle reflected in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum pro-
dere27 before the Star Chamber, but from a “profound reorder-
ing” of the criminal trial process in the late eighteenth and ear-
ly nineteenth centuries away from the “accused speaks” model 
and toward the “testing the prosecution” model.28 The central 
figure in this reordering, whose emerging role was both re-
quired and made possible by it, was defense counsel. 
 
 23. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 43–82 (1968); 
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2250, at 
269 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961). 
 24. See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the 
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 
1122–23 (1994). 
 25. John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1994). Lang-
bein’s work complements that of other scholars who trace nemo tenetur seip-
sum propere not to opposition by common law courts to inquisitorial processes 
but instead to the ius commune, and who have sought to unpack the jurisdic-
tional struggles between the Star Chamber and common law courts. See gen-
erally Charles M. Gray, Self-Incrimination in Interjurisdictional Law: The Six-
teenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 47, 47–81 (R.H. Helmholz 
ed., 1997); Richard H. Helmholz, The Privilege and the Ius Commune: The 
Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 17, 17–46. Levy’s 
spirited rebuttal of these works, which spends a considerable number of its 
pages on Langbein, does not effectively controvert his conclusion that the “ac-
cused speaks” model characterized pre-nineteenth century English criminal 
practice. See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment and Its Critics, 
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 821, 833–49 (1997) (responding to Langbein). 
 26. Langbein, supra note 25, at 1058–59. 
 27. Translated, the maxim means “no one is bound to inform against him-
self.” Helen Silving, The Oath: Part I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1366–67 (1959). See 
generally John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 
71 (1891) (discussing the origin of the maxim). 
 28. Langbein, supra note 25, at 1047. 
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Langbein has argued that foreclosure of an effective role 
for defense counsel formed the “bedrock principle” of the “ac-
cused speaks” trial, the primary justifications for which find a 
modern echo in works such as Making Defendants Speak: (1) 
that innocent defendants are their own best advocates, and (2) 
that guilty defendants’ self-incrimination is a needed testi-
monial resource.29 Other aspects of the system—including pre-
trial confinement, limitations on defendants’ ability to compel 
witnesses to testify for the defense and on even voluntary de-
fense witnesses’ testimony, a poorly formulated and weakly 
realized prosecutorial burden and standard of proof, and con-
straints on defendants’ pretrial preparation—all combined to 
leave defendants little choice but to speak at trial: 
Thus, the defendant was not only locked up, denied the assistance of 
counsel in preparing and presenting his defense, and restricted in ob-
taining defense witnesses, he was also given no precise statement of 
the charges against him until he stood before the court at the moment 
of his trial. The total drift of these measures was greatly to restrict 
defensive opportunity of any sort other than responding personally at 
trial to the incriminating evidence.30 
The pressure to speak obtained routinely in pretrial ex-
amination of defendants by magistrates under the Marian 
Committal Statute of 1555,31 the purpose of which was “to col-
lect only prosecution evidence;” the defendant was “expected to 
answer” the magistrate’s questions and any refusal to do so 
would be reported by the magistrate at trial.32 The pressure to 
speak continued at trial, which as a practical matter usually 
was more about whether the defendant would be convicted of a 
capital crime or some lesser offense (or would obtain a judicial 
recommendation to the crown for clemency) than it was about 
ultimate guilt or innocence.33 The “accused speaks” model ap-
parently was effective: assertion of a privilege against self-
incrimination by defendants in ordinary criminal trials in Eng-
land appears to have been virtually nonexistent.34 
Eben Moglen’s study has found that the “accused speaks” 
model described by Langbein “represented the common core of 
 
 29. See id. at 1053–54. Langbein has pointed out that, even after defense 
counsel were permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses, the continu-
ing prohibition on defense counsel addressing the jury as a practical matter 
forced defendants to speak for themselves. Id. at 1055. 
 30. Id. at 1058. 
 31. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 10 (Eng.). 
 32. Id. at 1059–61 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33. Id. at 1064–65. 
 34. Id. at 1066. 
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English criminal procedure in America during the first century 
of settlement.”35 If anything, for a number of reasons (including 
scarcity of lawyers and ideological antipathy towards them) de-
fense counsel’s role in early American criminal trials was even 
more circumscribed.36 Also, as a practical matter, “sworn or un-
sworn, defense witnesses at trial generally were scarce com-
modities.”37 And pretrial examination before magistrates, fol-
lowing the Marian Committal Statute process, drove toward 
self-incrimination.38 “Colonial American criminal justice de-
pended upon self-incrimination in practice precisely because 
the basic design of the system assumed it would.”39 The doc-
trine of nemo tenetur prodere seipsum did have some traction in 
attitudes about examination of witnesses and the accused by 
the authorities and on the use of violence (including threat of 
spiritual violence through the oath ex officio)—although physi-
cal violence apparently was not completely prohibited but in-
stead calibrated by the doctrine.40 And the abhorrence of oaths 
was circumvented by the simple expedient of examining the ac-
cused unsworn.41 Nevertheless, Moglen concluded, as a practic-
al matter: 
[A]t the center of that system stood the defendant, friendless and 
alone, confronting the evidence and his fate. So long as he remained 
in that condition, and it was the fixed purpose of the system to keep 
him there, any notion of the defendant’s privilege against self-
incrimination was but a phantom of the law.42 
This state of affairs, he found, reflected social conditions at 
the time—a geographically dispersed population, scant prose-
cutorial and judicial resources, social and economic stratifica-
tion disadvantaging the itinerant and the indigent, a minimal 
or nonexistent defense bar, and increasing social disorder in 
the decades immediately preceding the Revolution—which 
combined to increase reliance on summary jurisdiction of lay 
magistrates and further promote the “accused speaks” model.43 
This recital raises the question of how to reconcile the fa-
cially broad state and federal constitutional provisions related 
 
 35. Moglen, supra note 24, at 1091–92. 
 36. See id. at 1092–93. 
 37. Id. at 1094. 
 38. Id. at 1098. 
 39. Id. at 1104. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 1100–01. 
 42. Id. at 1104. 
 43. See id. at 1105–11. 
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to criminal procedure (including nemo tenetur) embraced by 
Revolutionary Americans with the apparently conflicting prac-
tices then prevailing.44 Moglen’s account is two-fold. First, 
those provisions were seen as protecting not against current 
criminal practices but against rhetorically powerful but even 
then-dated images such as the Star Chamber and the potential 
future adoption of “innovative” or “foreign” practices; they were 
measures conservatory rather than reformatory of extant legal 
structures.45 Second, he argued that those constitutional provi-
sions converged on the lay jury as the ultimate protection 
against government overreaching: “these procedural guaran-
tees, including the privilege against self-incrimination, were 
part of a cluster of legal rules, conceived not primarily as inde-
pendent, free-standing rights, but rather as part of the consti-
tutional system for protecting all rights by ensuring that gov-
ernment activity met the fundamental check of juries subject to 
law.”46 
B. THIS IS NOW 
The foregoing account has been recited, along with criti-
cism of the conceptual and moral underpinnings of the right to 
silence, in support of a more historically faithful interpretation 
of the Fifth Amendment that would allow a return to those ear-
lier practices, including adverse inferences from the accused’s 
silence in pretrial examinations and at trial.47 We think, how-
ever, that it can also point the other way. It provides a bench-
mark against which to gauge just how profoundly our criminal 
justice system—and our understanding of the Fifth Amend-
 
 44. Alschuler parts company with Moglen at this juncture, contending 
that the Framers would not have seen an inconsistency between prevailing 
practices and constitutional protections, largely because criminal defendants 
were not placed under oath and therefore not subject to that peculiar form of 
compulsion. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2657–58. For an argument that the 
right to counsel and the formal adversary system were well-established by the 
time of the Revolution, see Randolph Jonakait, The Origins of the Confronta-
tion Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 95–96 (1995); Ran-
dolph Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before 
England, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 327–28 (2008). For the argument that the 
privilege was well-established both in post-revolutionary England and pre-
revolutionary British North America, see R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and 
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 
21 VA. L. REV. 763, 775 (1935). 
 45. Moglen, supra note 24, at 1116–22. 
 46. Id. at 1118. 
 47. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2669–72. 
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ment—has changed, and that transformation itself suggests 
that the intuitions underlying the right to silence may be larger 
than the sum of its many critics.  
While neither yesterday’s nor today’s systems completely 
fit Langbein’s respective labels, it is clear that we have moved 
quite far from an “accused speaks” toward a “test the prosecu-
tion” model largely in the ways Langbein and Moglen identify. 
If the extent to which historical practice reflected the “accused 
speaks” model is taken as a measure of founding-era accep-
tance of its normative precepts, then it would seem that the 
pervasiveness of today’s “test the prosecution” approach indi-
cates the contemporary dominance of the latter approach’s 
premises. And if the central figure in that transformation is de-
fense counsel, then that figure’s ubiquity and recognition as 
foundational to the modern adversary system marks the extent 
of the transformation. Although the Court has vacillated, some-
times importantly so, on the particulars of the right to coun-
sel,48 that right nevertheless receives both rhetorical recogni-
tion and substantial protection, and the unrepresented criminal 
defendant in all but the most minor of cases is a rare exception. 
The right to counsel is a fundamental fair-trial right,49 the 
denial of which is per se harmful error,50 for without a lawyer 
to assist him, the confrontation between defendant and accus-
ers can hardly be called fair. “[L]awyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries.”51 The right appertains whenever the 
 
 48. In Montejo v. Louisiana, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Souter and Breyer) dissented from the Court’s overruling of Michigan v. Jack-
son. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2094 (2009) (citing Jackson, 475 U.S. 623 
(1986)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority found Jackson unnecessary, giv-
en that its purpose was to prevent police from badgering defendants in the 
custodial interrogation setting. Id. at 2089 (majority opinion). Thus, Jackson 
overlapped with the protections already provided by the Miranda-Edwards-
Minnick line of cases. Id. at 2089–90. The dissenters disagreed, noting that 
the right to counsel attaches when adversarial judicial proceedings begin and 
guarantees the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a prosecution 
whether in or out of court. Id. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Sixth 
Amendment right protects the accused (usually an unaided layman) at critical 
stages of adversarial confrontation. Its protections are not limited to the Mi-
randa custodial interrogation setting; it is much broader. See id. at 2100. It 
protects “the public’s interest in knowing that counsel, once secured, may be 
reasonably relied upon as a medium between the accused and the power of the 
State. That interest lies at the heart of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.” Id. 
at 2098. 
 49. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 50. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (citing Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). 
 51. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
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defendant is subjected to actual imprisonment,52 whether 
charged with a petty offense, a misdemeanor, or a felony,53 and 
it applies not only at trial but during the pretrial stage “when 
consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are] 
vitally important.”54 In fact, the pretrial stage may present 
even greater dangers for the defendant than the trial itself.55 
The fundamental, essential role of counsel is recognized by 
related Sixth Amendment cases as well as in other contexts. 
The Court’s recent Confrontation Clause cases recognize that a 
fair trial is not one that reaches an accurate result in a truth-
seeking process but, rather, one that reaches a fair result in an 
adversarial system.56 The Sixth Amendment “commands, not 
that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”57 The Court also relied on the role of counsel in 
abandoning a seventy-year-old evidentiary tradition of defer-
ring to scientific or other specialized sources for a determina-
tion of when an expert witness might offer opinion testimony, 
replacing it with a more traditional evidentiary approach that 
relies on “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of con-
trary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof 
[as] the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky 
but admissible evidence.”58 And where expert testimony is criti-
 
 52. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). 
 53. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
 54. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (quoting Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). This principle has been “broadly reaffirmed” 
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 205 (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 
(1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)); see also Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (“[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary 
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal re-
presentation when the government interrogates him.”); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 
342–45. 
 55. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2099 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“Given the realities of modern criminal prosecution, the critical 
proceedings at which counsel’s assistance is required more and more often oc-
cur outside the courtroom in pretrial proceedings . . . .”).  
 56. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) 
(reaffirming the prosecution’s obligation to prove the defendant’s guilt in an 
adversarial process, a process which “may make the prosecution of criminals 
more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those 
other constitutional provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at our 
convenience.”); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). 
 57. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).  
 58. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 
(1993). 
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cal, the defendant has a due process right not only to cross-
examine the state’s expert, but also to an expert’s assistance “in 
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense”59 in 
an adversarial system where counsel, not the defendant, tests 
the government’s evidence. 
The right to counsel is explicitly and implicitly linked to 
the protections against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment. In both the state and federal confession cases that 
led up to Miranda,60 there was an element of deprivation of 
counsel that troubled the Court.61 When the Court applied the 
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause to the states, it 
noted that ours is an accusatorial, not inquisitorial, system, in 
which a person has the right “to remain silent unless he choos-
es to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to 
suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence.”62 Esco-
bedo v. Illinois,63 the Court’s last gasp at avoiding Miranda, 
tried to “tease back” the Sixth Amendment to reach the prob-
lem of incommunicado questioning. With Miranda, however, 
the Court finally recognized what it had been wrestling with in 
various, disparate contexts64: that the right to silence was 
meaningless unless the compulsion inherent in custodial inter-
rogation were to be diffused by warning the suspect not only of 
his right to silence, but of his right to an attorney to help make 
the right to silence meaningful.65 In the four decades since Mi-
 
 59. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
 60. Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 61. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513–15 (1963) (re-
peated requests to call counsel denied); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–
23 (1959) (defendant’s requests for counsel ignored); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 
U.S. 504, 511 (1958) (mutual requests by lawyer and client to meet were de-
nied), abrogated by Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 n.48; Crooker v. California, 357 
U.S. 433, 439–40 (1958) (law student request for counsel at beginning of inter-
rogation denied), abrogated by Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 n.48. The cases of 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455–56 (1957), and McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1943), modified by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 
(2006), as recognized in Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (2009), 
taken together, respond to a concern that defendants not be left to their own 
devices when dealing with the criminal justice system. 
 62. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 63. 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (2006). 
 64. The counsel issue also arose in the Fourth Amendment setting, for one 
of the critical concerns in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961) (applying the 
exclusionary rule to the states), was the fact that the police would not allow 
the suspect to consult with her attorney, who was present at Dollree Mapp’s 
home when it was unlawfully searched. 
 65. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466. 
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randa, the Court’s jurisprudence has been inconsistent to say 
the least;66 but if the Court seriously wanted to rethink the in-
volvement of, and reliance on, defense counsel in the criminal 
justice system, that opportunity came with Dickerson v. United 
States.67 Rather than upholding Congress’s attempt to overrule 
Miranda two years after the case was decided,68 the Court in-
stead found Miranda to be part of our national culture and a 
constitutional decision that Congress is without power to re-
ject.69 
Both the right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination reinforce the accusatory and adversarial nature 
of the criminal justice system. Thus, as David Sklansky recent-
ly put it, “[a]nti-inquisitorialism” is “a broad and enduring 
theme of American criminal procedure.”70 At the conclusion of 
its 2008 term,71 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that 
ours is an accusatorial, confrontational system of criminal jus-
tice in which the government has the burden of proving guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt when it chooses to exercise the pow-
er to punish. “[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on 
the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant 
to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”72 The Court’s re-
 
 66. Despite the holding that no statement made in response to non-
Mirandized interrogation can be used against the defendant, Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 479, the Court since Miranda has retreated from this central holding. 
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (allowing non-Mirandized 
statements to be “cured” by subsequent warnings and waiver); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450–52 (1974) (allowing derivative use of non-
Mirandized statements); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (al-
lowing collateral use of non-Mirandized statements). But see Missouri v. Sei-
bert, 542 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (plurality opinion) (concluding that deliberate 
“question-first” tactic compromised subsequent warning’s effectiveness); Els-
tad, 470 U.S. at 370–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that whether a 
statement is actually coerced or irrebuttably presumed to be coerced is a dis-
tinction with no constitutional significance). 
 67. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1968) (“In any criminal prosecution brought 
by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in 
subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily giv-
en.”). 
 69. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
 70. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 
1635 (2009). For analysis of the right to silence as reinforcing the prosecution’s 
due process burden, see generally Marvin Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the 
Fifth Amendment Right to Silence, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197 (1979). 
 71. At the time this article was written, the Supreme Court had just de-
cided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 72. Id. at 2540. 
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jection of the complaint that this “may make the prosecution of 
criminals more burdensome”73—a complaint frequently found 
in critiques of Miranda and Griffin—is but the latest pro-
nouncement in a line of cases of which In re Winship74 is the 
foremost articulation of the principle. All these cases, taken to-
gether or alone, stand for the principle that when the govern-
ment seeks to punish, it must prove each and every element of 
the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, in an adver-
sarial system in which the defendant is represented by counsel 
who will test the government’s case. 
In summary, whatever the normative underpinnings of the 
right to silence, the modern network of rights comprising to-
day’s “test the prosecution” criminal justice system recogniz-
es—indeed necessitates—its presence just as potently as the 
network of practices comprising the “accused speaks” system 
effectuated its practical absence. And if the cluster of protec-
tions of which it is a part takes the Fifth Amendment beyond 
the scope contemplated by its Framers, it does so in the context 
of a criminal justice system, and more generally an administra-
tive and bureaucratic state, which itself vastly exceeds any-
thing familiar to them or their English counterparts.75 It is dif-
ficult to grasp the extent of those changes. The industrial, 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 230 (2005) (invalidating mandatory nature of the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines; reaffirming constitutional protection of defendants against conviction in 
the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; requiring that facts increasing 
sentences for crimes beyond prescribed statutory maxima must be submitted 
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (requiring that “any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 
(2002) (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment 
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels 
it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (finding that the defendant’s “sentence vi-
olated his right to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of 
the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt’”); Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977) (limiting states’ ability to “reallocate bur-
dens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the 
crimes now defined in their statutes”); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 
(1975) (“[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . .”). 
 75. Cf. Aaron M. Clemens, The Pending Reinvigoration of Boyd: Personal 
Papers Are Protected by the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 25 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 75, 101 (2004) (recognizing that “the Court has been forced to interpret 
the privilege in situations that the Founders did not predict”). 
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administrative, and cyber revolutions have expanded govern-
ment’s ability to criminalize, investigate, monitor, prosecute, 
convict, and incarcerate citizens to an extent that surely would 
have staggered and probably horrified founding-era imagina-
tions.76  
The extensive and complex web of today’s federal, state, 
and local criminal laws, and malum prohibitum regulatory pro-
visions enforced by criminal sanctions, would have been un-
imaginable in the eighteenth century.77 Indeed, several scho-
lars have located the origins of the modern Fifth Amendment 
right to silence in the late-nineteenth century’s expanding fed-
eral regulatory presence.78 Prosecutorial, defense, and judicial 
resources—which were relatively scarce in colonial and revolu-
tionary America79—are now relatively abundant and deeply in-
stitutionalized. And the entire process has managed to achieve 
an incarceration rate that is one of the highest in the world. 
“The most important conclusion” to be drawn about coloni-
al-era crime throughout British North America, especially 
crimes against person and property, “is that there was very lit-
tle of it.”80 Social and economic conditions—small, isolated pop-
ulations living primarily in villages and towns, with little va-
 
 76. The founders would never have imagined the use of DNA evidence; 
evidence obtained from a computer forensic examination; the use of heat sens-
ing, x-ray, and metal detection devices; wiretap and other voice and/or video 
recordings; the use of surveillance cameras; or “the results of the commonly 
used gas chromatography/mass spectrometry analysis.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2537 (referring to authorities discussing critical errors in gas chromato-
graphy/mass spectrometry analysis). 
 77. If anything, the Court’s oddly haphazard attempts to check Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power in this regard only underscore the point. Compare 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating the Violence 
Against Women Act on the grounds that sex-based assaults do not constitute 
“economic activity”), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (in-
validating the Gun-Free School Zones Act because the possession of firearms 
near schools lacked a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce), with Gon-
zales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) (upholding the Controlled Substances Act 
by characterizing “the production, distribution, and consumption” of drugs as 
having “an established, and lucrative, interstate market”). 
 78. See, e.g., Katharine B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the 
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
235, 258–59 (1998) (“As federal law grew in scope and importance, courts 
turned more readily to the constitution to answer challenges to the validity of 
federal statutes . . . forcing courts to determine whether the witness privilege 
was a common law or constitutional right . . . .”). 
 79. Moglen, supra note 24, at 1105; see also supra text accompanying note 
36. 
 80. BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: 1606–
1660, at 139 (1983). 
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gabondage, low unemployment, adequate subsistence, and rela-
tively little economic stratification—all likely contributed to the 
low rate of such crime.81 And the objects of the criminal justice 
system changed along with social conditions. In Massachusetts, 
for example, “crimes against morality dominated in the colonial 
era,”82 but by the post-revolutionary period, as wealth and pop-
ulations increased and became more concentrated and strati-
fied, property crimes and social-order related offenses came to 
dominate.83 The localized and parochial nature of community 
life, preoccupation with sin and heterodoxy, and the absence of 
organized law enforcement authority meant that in the New 
England colonies, social control derived from “intense surveil-
lance by neighbors,” rather than “patrol by a public police,”84 
thus enforcing consensus and conformist norms.85  
Whereas it seems unlikely that most founding-era citizens 
had personal encounters with law enforcement officials, today 
such encounters are commonplace. The police presence we take 
for granted (or at least in stride) today did not begin to emerge 
in the United States or England until the nineteenth century. 
As Carol Steiker has observed: 
The metamorphosis of the colonial constabulary and watch into the 
recognizable precursors of modern-day law enforcement illustrates 
the ways in which the invention of the police created new threats to 
liberty. Our colonial forebears could not have predicted the sheer 
numbers of law enforcement agents at work today, the breadth of 
their operational mandate, or their pervasive authoritarian pres-
ence.86 
In comparison to the eighteenth century, the police today are 
virtually everywhere, impacting the lives of almost everyone by 
their very presence, and often their direct actions.87 
 
 81. Id. at 139–41. 
 82. MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUS-
TICE, AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767–1878, 
at 63 (1980). 
 83. See id. at 67–70. 
 84. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 18 (2d ed. 1998). 
 85. Id. at 15–16. Walker, too, warns against overgeneralization, contrast-
ing relatively homogenous Puritan New England (particularly Massachusetts) 
with more diverse, densely populated, and cosmopolitan New York, and with 
the slavery-based societies of the South (particularly South Carolina). Id. at 
16–17. 
 86. Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 820, 837 (1994). 
 87. According to the United States Department of Justice, there were 
836,787 full-time sworn law enforcement officers in the United States in the 
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Not only has police presence become substantially more 
pervasive in general, but the potential consequences of speak-
ing to police have also become more complicated in two particu-
lar ways. First, “[a] crude conception of guilt or innocence, ac-
cording to which the suspect either ‘did it’ or ‘didn’t do it’ has 
tended to underpin the debate about the right to silence.”88 
Some offenses, however, are defined in terms of mental states 
“which separate them by a hairsbreadth from innocent conduct” 
and so the police interview not only can uncover crimes, but in 
a sense can also help to “create them.”89 Second, the “current 
prosecutorial arsenal” concerning perjury and related offenses 
exceeds its common law antecedents.90 Under the most widely 
used federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, even a minimal denial of 
guilt—the so-called exculpatory no—can be the basis for prose-
cution.91 As Justice Ginsburg has noted, this result gives prose-
cutors tremendous power to “manufacture crimes” (especially 
given the frequency of informal, uncounseled, and unwarned 
interviews of individuals by government agents).92 
It is by now a familiar if not entirely uncontroversial 
process for the content of a constitutional protection to evolve 
beyond the particular scope its framers would have endorsed, 
especially when conditions have changed in pertinent and im-
 
year 2004, of which 731,903 were employed by almost 18,000 different state 
and local agencies. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Law En-
forcement Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (last visited Nov. 
17, 2009). Not only are there literally myriads of different departments, but 
there are also millions-upon-millions of encounters between police and resi-
dents of the United States. In 2005, more than forty-three million, or 19% of 
United States residents aged sixteen and older, had at least one face-to-face 
contact with police. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CON-
TACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 1 (2007). Many individuals 
had more than one encounter and there were a total of approximately seventy-
one million such encounters in 2005. Id. at 2.  
 88. Steven Greer, The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate, 53 
MOD. L. REV. 709, 727 (1990). 
 89. Id. at 727–28. 
 90. Richard H. Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer’s History of the Law 
of Perjury, 10 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 215, 248 (1993). 
 91. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 398 (1998) (rejecting 
the “exculpatory no” exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 
both as a matter of statutory construction and under the Fifth Amendment). 
For a comprehensive discussion of the broad scope and frequent application of 
false statement laws, see generally Andrea C. Halverson & Eric D. Olson, 
False Statements and False Claims, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 555 (2009).  
 92. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408–11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). To reduce that 
risk, the Department of Justice discourages such prosecutions. See Halverson 
& Olson, supra note 91, at 567 & n.93. 
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portant ways.93 Application of that process to the present prob-
lem would seem especially appropriate. To the extent that crit-
ics of a robust right to silence base their position on an inter-
pretation of the Fifth Amendment limited to founding-era 
understandings, they are insisting on a return to the kind of 
“accused speaks” model which obtained in a world that no long-
er exists and which the gradual adoption of the “test the prose-
cution” approach has displaced. And that displacement has re-
sulted from invigoration of a “cluster of legal rules” oriented not 
so much around the lay jury in this age of plea bargaining94 as 
around the requirement that the government prove its case. 
Superimposition of the earlier, much narrower interpretation 
on a vastly expanded and intrusive criminal justice system, 
without regard for such pervasive legal and social change, 
seems anachronistic and misplaced. 
II.  A ROBUST RIGHT TO SILENCE   
In view of these two important developments—the emer-
gence of the “test the prosecution” model and government’s 
vastly increased capacity and willingness to mobilize law-
enforcement resources against its citizens—the intuitions ex-
pressed in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,95 while perhaps 
hyperbolic, do not sound so out-of-place. Those “fundamental 
values” and “noble aspirations” include: protection of the ac-
cused from the “cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or 
contempt;” “our preference for an accusatorial rather than an 
inquisitorial system;” fear of inhumane and abusive interroga-
tion; a “fair play” norm requiring the government to leave the 
 
 93. Famous examples include, of course, Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954) (“In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the 
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted . . . . We must consider 
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in 
American life throughout the Nation.”), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9–
10 (1967) (“While these statements have some relevance to the intention of 
Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood 
that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes and not to the broader, 
organic purpose of a constitutional amendment.”). The Court explicitly recog-
nized this approach to the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”). 
 94. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. Despite its relatively infre-
quent invocation however, the right to a jury trial as a bedrock protection has 
received increased emphasis in recent years by the Court. See supra note 74.  
 95. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
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individual alone unless there is good cause to disturb him or 
her and “requiring the government in its contest with the indi-
vidual to shoulder the entire load;” respect for “inviolability of 
the human personality” and a right to privacy; and protection 
of innocent defendants.96 Yet the right to silence has been a 
heavily criticized doctrine. 
The usual approach is to consider the right in isolation and 
in the abstract, and to dissect each particular rationale. As Da-
vid Dolinko put it in his comprehensive critique, “[a]ppeal to an 
unanalyzable intuition . . . is simply unacceptable as support 
for the privilege against self-incrimination.”97 He has organized 
the putative justifications into “systemic” and “individual” ra-
tionales.98 Among the justifications that he seeks to repudiate 
is the systemic goal of “imposing on the government the entire 
burden of proving guilt in a criminal case.”99 And among the 
“individual rationales” that he finds unpersuasive are the pri-
vacy, dignity, and autonomy arguments.100 A common thread 
running through criticisms of these justifications is that a right 
to silence provides incomplete protection to any of the interests 
they reflect. For example, the privilege does not force the gov-
ernment to “shoulder the entire load”101 because government 
may still introduce physical evidence such as blood samples, 
fingerprints, handwriting and voice exemplars, and the results 
of eyewitness identification procedures, all involuntarily ob-
tained from the accused.102 Whatever choices it protects against 
are not obviously more or less “cruel” than many others it does 
not preclude.103 The privilege neither protects a recognizably 
distinct privacy interest nor precludes a wide array of intru-
sions and, in any event, constitutional privacy protections are 
ordinarily subjected to a balancing test which considers the 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1092 (1986). 
 98. Id. at 1065. 
 99. Id. at 1083. For an exposition of this justification based on the Court’s 
case law, see Schiller, supra note 70, at passim. 
 100. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1090–1147. 
 101. Id. at 1084 (citation omitted). 
 102. See id. at 1083. For another statement of this point, see Akhil Reed 
Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 892–94 (1995). See also Steven 
Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 309, 373–79 (1998) (cataloging criticisms of “self-determination” justi-
fications for Miranda). 
 103. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1090–97. 
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government’s need.104 In other words, the right to silence, dis-
liked in practice for its perceived result of shielding the guilty 
and depriving the prosecution of needed evidence, is criticized 
in theory for the protection it fails to effectively provide. 
But perhaps more might be said in this context on behalf of 
“intuition” (which, if not unanalyzed, at least is not overana-
lyzed), and less in favor of objections based on underinclusive-
ness and overinclusiveness. Underinclusiveness objections 
seem more appropriately deployed in challenges to choices 
made by the authorities in the assertions of governmental pow-
er, rather than to norms underlying rights claims. A govern-
ment choice only minimally to pursue a particular end is some 
evidence that the particular end in question is not very impor-
tant105 or sincerely sought.106 This reasoning is most familiar in 
cases applying antidiscrimination principles and seeks, as Jus-
tice O’Connor famously put it, to “smoke out” impermissible 
purposes.107 The intensity of the scrutiny of fit is a function of 
the degree of perceived risk to the norms that might constrain 
the government action in question. But the privilege’s critics 
surely do not mean that the Court’s rejection of Armando 
Schmerber’s Fifth Amendment claim108 calls into question the 
sincerity of Edward Dean Griffin’s claim. Rather, the critics 
seem to mean that because the Court has permitted the intru-
sions it has, no meaningful portion of the rights-domain re-
mains to be protected or that the rights-domain itself is mis-
conceived. 
 
 104. See id. at 1108–22. 
 105. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984) 
(“The modest nature of Oklahoma’s interests may be further illustrated by 
noting that Oklahoma has chosen not to press its campaign against alcoholic 
beverage advertising on all fronts.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390 
(1978) (noting that the “challenged provisions” of a Wisconsin statute purport-
ing to protect the financial interests of children were “grossly underinclusive” 
with respect to the stated purpose). 
 106. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a 
goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same).  
 107. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493. 
 108. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding that 
evidence of analysis of blood taken by a doctor after a drunk driving arrest 
was admissible and did not violate the Fifth Amendment, despite Schmerber’s 
refusal to consent to the withdrawal of blood); see also Amar & Lettow, supra 
note 102, at 885 (arguing that Schmerber is an example of the privilege’s un-
derinclusiveness). 
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We see several problems with that proposition. First, even 
assuming that the Court has allowed a large portion of the in-
terest to be compromised, such result does not necessarily dis-
prove the existence of the interest itself. The Court’s reasoning 
in denying claims could be flawed.109 Second, the Court’s choic-
es do not necessarily mean that no meaningful residuum of pro-
tected domain remains. The norms captured by capacious la-
bels such as “privacy,” “autonomy,” or “dignity”110 are complex 
and variegated such that the Court’s rejection of a part would 
hardly seem to constitute negation of the whole. As we briefly 
suggest below, there is recognizable and meaningful content, 
even if not theoretically tidy, to a right not to testify at trial 
and to preclude prosecutorial comment and judicial instruction 
on its exercise.111 These difficulties with underinclusiveness 
reasoning are illustrated by its application to the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which is hardly a model of 
doctrinal clarity. For example, the Court’s reasoning in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., which found that a full-blown warrantless sei-
zure and search based only on reasonable suspicion adequately 
protected the right to privacy in the school context,112 is itself 
open to question on its own terms and in any event does not 
exhaust the entire domain of “privacy” or “reasonableness.”113  
The overinclusiveness objection—that the privilege fails to 
yield through a balancing test to government need—includes at 
least two flaws. An obvious one is that the text of the Fifth 
Amendment, in contrast to that of the Fourth, does not include 
a reasonableness element.114 Another is that the objection mis-
apprehends the nature of privileges. They are indeed subject to 
a kind of categorical balancing because their application is cir-
cumscribed, as the underinclusiveness critique is at pains to 
 
 109. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text. Also, compare the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). For 
recent work criticizing the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as resting 
on confused premises, see Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amend-
ment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487 passim (2009). 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 111. See infra text accompanying notes 162–70. 
 112. 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985). 
 113. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 
(2009) (concluding that a higher standard of suspicion is required to justify 
more intrusive searches, such as a strip search of a school child). 
 114. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be se-
cure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”) (emphasis added), 
with U.S. CONST. amend. V (containing no similar reasonableness require-
ment). 
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point out.115 But case-by-case balancing is generally not appro-
priate with respect to privileges. For those that protect confi-
dential relationships, such balancing would “eviscerate the ef-
fectiveness of the privilege.”116 For the Fifth Amendment, as 
events since September 11, 2001, demonstrate, the risk that 
case-by-case balancing would effectively swallow the rule is 
more than speculative.117 
Nor is it clear to us that the intuitions attributable to a 
right to silence are necessarily so opaque or anomalous to war-
rant such “strict scrutiny.”118 A point of departure in the litera-
ture critical of the right to silence is the observation that it de-
fies, as Judge Friendly put it, “notions of decent conduct 
generally accepted in life outside the court room.”119 To Judge 
Friendly, this point distinguishes the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege from most others recognized by law, which are based on 
valued relations (such as the husband-wife, lawyer-client, doc-
 
 115. Examples of limitations on the Fifth Amendment’s scope, some of 
which include explicit balancing, are easy to find. See, e.g., United States v. 
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643–44 (2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 
U.S. 177, 189–91 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764–68 (2003); 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649, 654–58 (1984); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235–38 (1980); Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444–46 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 
225–26 (1971). 
 116. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996). Our reference here to other 
privileges does not concede the “privileges” analysis in Part II.A.3 of Making 
Defendants Speak. See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1350–53 (distinguish-
ing adverse inferences in the context of various privileges). That analysis fails 
to adequately account for the constitutional interests at stake and mistakenly 
assumes a background duty to speak, which the Fifth Amendment itself ob-
viates. Cf. id. (noting the historical rationale supporting the use of adverse in-
ferences in instances of failure to speak or to produce evidence). As Justice 
Black put it, “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if per-
sons can be penalized for relying on them.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 
U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring). For an argument that adverse in-
ferences from invocation of the attorney-client privilege compromise that rela-
tionship, see Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences upon a 
Claim of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1355, 1407–20 
(1995). 
 117. For a description of such a process regarding the Fourth Amendment, 
see Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings 
of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 745–47 (2007). 
 118. Dolinko concluded that they were. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1068–69 
(considering, as a threshold matter, whether the privilege “really needs justi-
fying” and concluding that it does based on “our ordinary intuitions as to when 
silence in the face of accusatory questioning is appropriate”). 
 119. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for 
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 680 (1968). 
  
34 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [94:11 
 
tor-patient, and priest-penitent privileges).120 Kent Greenawalt 
has attempted to bridge that perceived disparity by observing 
that in their ordinary relations, people do not expect to be obli-
gated to account for their conduct to one another, unless the re-
lations are especially close, or the basis for inquiry or suspicion 
is especially strong.121 Dolinko quotes Friendly as an example 
of the “consensus” view that the right to silence is morally per-
verse, and sees in the Greenawalt principle a lever for prying 
the privilege away from criminal defendants who, after all, are 
not in close relation to the state, and against whom there is al-
most always more than a slender basis for suspicion.122 This 
latter point provided the moral ground for Alschuler’s proposal 
to overrule Griffin and return to something like the Marian 
Committal Statute process.123 
But what would things look like if we turned the telescope 
around and, as we should at the rights-recognition stage, 
viewed the matter from the defendant’s perspective? As indi-
cated above, the robust right to silence in general, and Griffin 
in particular, are not some dusty vestige of an outmoded legal 
past, but are part of a cluster of developments to emerge in to-
day’s criminal justice system. One would expect that the intui-
tions it reflects are compatible with, rather than antithetical to, 
modern sensibilities. And so they are, if one keeps in mind the 
nature of the relations involved and views them from the de-
fendant’s perspective. 
Friendly’s objection to the privilege124 and Greenawalt’s 
sophisticated attempt to justify a limited scope for it125 would 
impose the moral understandings and expectations of interper-
sonal relations on the uniquely inhuman relation between the 
accused and the state. The mistake in that move underscores 
our point. The relational norms of reciprocal care and regard 
between actual people simply do not obtain with the state, es-
 
 120. Id. (contrasting “most other privileges” with the Fifth Amendment). 
 121. See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 20–32 (1981) (analyzing the role of silence in cer-
tain private relationships). 
 122. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1068–69 (comparing the viewpoints of 
Friendly and Greenawalt). 
 123. See Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2633–38, 2668–69 (examining Green-
awalt’s theories and proposing alternatives to the current self-incrimination 
privilege). 
 124. See Friendly, supra note 119, at 721–26 (proposing his own alterations 
to the Fifth Amendment). 
 125. For an analysis of his position on the privilege, see Greenawalt, supra 
note 121, at 17–71. 
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pecially when it seeks to punish.126 The state is not a person 
who has feelings we ought to consider at all, or who will consid-
er any actual person’s feelings in return, and it is an error to 
premise any argument on such an analogy.127 The state itself—
even if represented by actual people who may be decent and 
humane individuals—is an inhuman, faceless, unfeeling, often 
voracious and potentially malignant entity which is precisely 
why relations with it are always a matter of rights and power 
rather than care and respect. The very notion of constitutional 
government presupposes this point. It is naive at best and dan-
gerous at worst to draw, as does Friendly, an analogy between 
a prosecutor and the loving and forgiving parent who is ex-
pected to have his or her child’s best interests at heart.128 In 
any event, even Judge Friendly’s intuitions got the better of his 
analysis in the end. After soundly ridiculing the Murphy claims 
on behalf of the privilege, he noted that many defendants are 
“uneducated, unfortunate persons, frightened by their predi-
cament” and opted to retain much of the current privilege’s pro-
tections, including its prohibition on adverse comment.129 
Murphy’s much-maligned intuitions, even if overstated, 
may come closer to capturing the peculiar circumstances of 
criminal prosecution. The right to silence, if nothing else, pre-
serves one small refuge of dignity for the accused and imposes 
one relatively modest constraint on governmental power.130 We 
 
 126. For a discussion of rights and care in the context of abortion rights, 
compare, for example, Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational 
Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1323 passim 
(1995). 
 127. Dolinko acknowledges this point. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1070 n.43 
(“The notion that one could have a personal relationship with the government 
may even be dangerous . . . .”); see also Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 321 
(“Whether Greenawalt (and Friendly) can fairly build on the morality of pri-
vate relationships to draw inferences about our moral obligations vís-a-vís the 
state seems to me highly debatable.”). 
 128. See Friendly, supra note 119, at 680 (“[T]he lesson parents preach is 
that while a misdeed . . . will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clean 
breast of it will not be.”). 
 129. Id. at 699–700 (quoting Alfred C. Clapp, Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 548 (1956)). Thus, Friendly responds 
to a concern that defendants not be left to their own devices when dealing with 
the criminal justice system. See id. (noting that such a practice “would be 
cruel”). Greenawalt, disputing the “penalty” rationale of Griffin, would allow 
“restrained judicial comment inviting natural adverse inferences . . . at least 
in jurisdictions that do not allow free use of prior convictions to impeach credi-
bility.” See Greenawalt, supra note 121, at 58–59. 
 130. For a theoretical account of the norm in privacy terms, see Robert S. 
Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 passim (1970). 
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believe this protection is more than inconsequential, even if 
modest in practical effect and conceptually indefinite. In a 
criminal prosecution the state seeks to deploy whatever re-
sources it deems worthwhile for the infliction of punishment on 
the accused. The ultimate goal may be justice, however well—
or ill—conceived and realized, but as a practical matter the 
immediate aim is conviction and punishment; and whatever 
protections the accused can expect throughout the entire de-
humanizing process derive not from care but from rights. It 
does not seem to us to flout ordinary moral understandings to 
recognize a right in someone to refuse to cooperate by providing 
a public account of his actions to a vastly more powerful and 
inhuman adversary, itself speaking exclusively through coun-
sel, which is specifically bent on hurting him. To the contrary, 
it seems of a piece with an understanding of the entire process 
which, while allowing the state latitude in evidence collection 
(including the collection of physical evidence from the accused) 
and presentation, allows the accused to otherwise stand mute 
and put the state to its proof. 
One of the difficulties in the literature on this subject is its 
theoretical nature, which reflects a triumph of abstraction over 
empathy. We do not believe that most ordinary people, actually 
confronted with the shock of finding themselves in the position 
of a criminal defendant, would have trouble understanding the 
refuge the right to silence provides. One of us served for years 
as a federal public defender and found that, apart from those 
who thought they could outsmart the system or the thoroughly 
angry and defiant, most clients were simply terrified—terrified 
at being caught up in the system, by the government’s enorm-
ous power, of interrogation and cross-examination, and most of 
all, terrified by the utter dehumanizing impersonality of it all. 
They were no longer Ed or Mary, but “the suspect,” “the ac-
cused,” “the defendant,” or “the prisoner.” They faced the im-
personalized overwhelming power of the jail, the courtroom, 
and the judge. The right to silence at the least protects the in-
dividual from having to subject himself or herself directly and 
personally to a face-to-face attack by the determined agents of 
the state.131 And Griffin’s rule recognizes that it is unseemly to 
 
 131. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 332 (noting that these concerns are 
especially potent for the innocent defendant “who fears he will be manipu-
lated, intimidated or misunderstood”). As Schulhofer pointed out, “[w]hen life 
or liberty is at stake, to force such a defendant to run the gauntlet of adver-
sarial cross-examination can fairly be described as inhumane or cruel.” Id. 
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empower the government to overtly bully the defendant in front 
of the jury by inviting an inference of guilt where there is only 
silence.  
In the end, a robust right to silence, as an integral part of 
the cluster of rights comprising the “test the prosecution” mod-
el, has held its own in American constitutional jurisprudence 
despite its many energetic and thoughtful critics. This persis-
tence may reflect a set of intuitions which, while not analytical-
ly tidy or entirely satisfying, are well-suited to the harsh reali-
ties of the modern criminal justice system. Griffin’s no-adverse-
inference rule, by precluding the prosecution and judge from 
inviting the jury to employ the silence of the accused as evi-
dence of his guilt,132 is consistent with that right. Its principle 
was well-established in the nation’s jurisprudence before Grif-
fin, as forty-four states and the federal government had 
adopted it by that time.133 It is a rule which the Court in its 
last consideration characterized as “of proven utility,”134 as 
having found “wide acceptance in the legal culture,” and as 
having “become an essential feature of our legal tradition,”135 
and which even its critics on the Court (with the lone exception 
of Justice Thomas) expressly declined to reconsider.136 
 
 132. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that “the Fifth 
Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s 
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt”).  
 133. Id. at 611 n.3 (“The overwhelming consensus of the States . . . is op-
posed to allowing comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.”). The trend it 
reflects thus was much more firmly established than that embraced under the 
Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test. See Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005) (holding that imposition of capital punish-
ment on one who committed a crime while under the age of eighteen years vi-
olates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002) (holding that execution of the mentally retarded vi-
olates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). And, unlike a free-
standing right to post-conviction access to DNA testing, which the Court found 
was not required by due process despite its adoption in all but a handful of 
states, neither finality of judgments nor management of post-conviction proce-
dures is implicated by the rule in Griffin. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Os-
borne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009) (“If we extended substantive due process to 
this area, we would cast these [forty-six state] statutes into constitutional 
doubt and be forced to take over the issue of DNA access ourselves.”). 
 134. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999) (extending the 
Griffin rule to preclude a sentencing court from drawing an adverse inference 
from the defendant’s silence). 
 135. Id. at 330. 
 136. Id. at 331–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the assertion “that 
the no-adverse-inference rule has found ‘wide acceptance in the legal cul-
ture’ . . . . may be true—which is adequate reason not to overrule these cases, 
a course I in no way propose” (quoting id. at 329 (majority opinion))). 
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III.  MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK AS TOO MUCH SUGAR 
FOR A DIME   
A. “ZERO-SUM GAME” 
In addition to our defense of the right to silence, we also of-
fer a few comments on several particular points presented in 
Making Defendants Speak. First, its “zero-sum game” paradigm 
seems misplaced as a practical matter.137 For one thing, its 
proposed reforms are not necessarily interdependent. Making 
Defendants Speak makes a good case for reform of the stan-
dards governing admissibility of prior convictions to reduce the 
prejudice to the testifying defendant as a matter of evidence 
law.138 They could be implemented without overruling Griffin. 
Our concerns about overruling Griffin obtain whether the Rule 
609(a)(1) standard is modified or not. Impeachment by prior 
conviction is of course a large practical disincentive to testify-
ing, but it is not the only concern. Further, reform of the Rule 
609(a)(1) standards obviously would do defendants without a 
prior criminal record no good at all. For them, even under Mak-
ing Defendant Speak’s own paradigm, it’s all stick and no car-
rot. And Making Defendants Speak would perversely put the 
innocent, anxious, vulnerable defendant—without any prior 
convictions and who has nothing much to say except an uncon-
vincing “I didn’t do it”—in the worst position of all.139 As for the 
proposed reform to the sentencing guidelines, its main effect 
may be to drive the consideration of perjury underground in the 
nonmandatory sentencing guidelines systems under Blakely v. 
Washington140 and United States v. Booker.141  
Making Defendants Speak is more usefully regarded as a 
relatively weak form of “exchange abolitionism.”142 This term 
was coined in a rebuttal to advocates of what was to become the 
 
 137. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1328 (characterizing the matter as a 
“zero-sum” game). 
 138. Id. at 1358–69 (proposing to abandon the Gordon test for Federal Rule 
of Evidence 609). 
 139. See Mike Redmayne, English Warnings, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047, 
1064 (2008) (explaining the problematic aspect of the evidentiary use of ad-
verse inference in the case of innocent defendants); Schulhofer, supra note 18, 
at 332–33 (noting that concerns about risks to the innocent and silent defen-
dant apply “even if th[e] rule were substantially limited or repealed”). Our 
concerns are not limited to the innocent defendant. 
 140. 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
 141. 543 U.S. 220, 258–65 (2005) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 142. See generally Greer, supra note 88, at 719–24. 
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Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994143 (the CJPOA) 
in England and Wales, which permitted adverse inferences to 
be drawn from the accused’s silence during police interroga-
tions as well as at trial.144 Adoption of the CJPOA has inspired 
leading American critics of Griffin and Miranda, such as Al-
schuler.145 “Exchange abolitionism” would “argue for the aboli-
tion of the right to silence in exchange for other defendants’ 
rights.”146 That exchange ultimately occurred in reverse order 
in England and Wales when the CJPOA was proposed to rectify 
a perceived imbalance between prosecution and defense attri-
buted to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984147 
(PACE), which provided suspects ready access to free legal ad-
vice during police interrogations (among other important pro-
tections).148 Making Defendants Speak is abolitionism because 
its premises are aimed at undermining the right to silence, but 
it is relatively weak because it purports to reach only silence at 
trial, and offers an only modest if not illusory exchange.  
The exchange proposed in Making Defendants Speak dif-
fers from the CJPOA model in several notable respects (in addi-
tion to not extending to pretrial interrogations). First, reforms 
to allow adverse inferences are advocated either on “evidential” 
 
 143. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33 (Eng.). 
 144. See Greer, supra note 87, at 719 (defining exchange abolitionism). Ac-
cording to Greer, “exchange abolitionism” is a softer version of “utilitarian ab-
olitionism,” which in turn is based on Bentham’s complaints about “the privi-
lege of silence” as the illegitimate refuge of the guilty and his position that the 
superordinate purpose of adjudication is accuracy of outcome. See id. (noting 
Bentham’s influence on utilitarian abolitionism). This latter approach would 
completely abolish any right to silence and most other defense rights as well. 
See id. (noting that utilitarian abolitionism theory “argued for the abolition of 
the right to silence without seeking to replace it with other safeguards for de-
fendants”).  
 145. See generally Alschuler, supra note 16. 
 146. Greer, supra note 88, at 719. As Greer observed, “[s]ome closet utilita-
rians may also be found in the [exchange abolitionism] camp, not because they 
have been converted to the notion of defendants’ rights, but because they may 
consider that acceding to rights discourse is the most effective way of achiev-
ing the abolition of the right to silence.” Id. 
 147. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.). 
 148. See generally Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1048–54 (outlining the 
background to the CJPOA and summarizing PACE). The CJPOA allows ad-
verse inferences from the accused’s silence during interrogation only if he re-
lied at trial on a fact he did not present during earlier interrogation. Id. at 
1048–49 (explaining the “triggering conditions” for adverse inferences). It gen-
erally allows the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference from the accused’s 
silence at trial. See id. at 1047.  
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or “incentivizing” grounds.149 “Evidential” grounds rest on an 
assumed logical relationship between the accused’s silence and 
the adverse inference: that silence during police questioning 
and at trial is indeed probative of guilt.150 “Incentivizing” 
grounds rest on an assumed empirical relationship between the 
inference and the accused’s likely behavior: that adverse infe-
rence will in fact encourage the accused to talk to police or to 
testify at trial.151 Making Defendants Speak frames its entire 
project around incentivizing grounds and does not address the 
implications and nuances of the evidential perspective. Yet, as 
Redmayne explains, incentivizing grounds are proper (quite 
apart from the normative debate about the right to silence it-
self) only if evidential relationships exist.152 Empirical support 
for incentivizing arguments is problematic;153 and the eviden-
tial relationships, especially with respect to a general adverse 
inference, can be complex and are not always well-founded.154 
Second, the exchange in England and Wales mostly in-
volved—indeed, was in part a reaction to—measures that 
strengthened the accused’s access to counsel during police in-
terviews.155 Making Defendants Speak offers as one of the puta-
 
 149. See id. at 1051 (noting the perceived imbalance sought to be corrected 
by the incentivizing argument). The pre-PACE Report of the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee invoked evidential arguments in recommending adverse 
inferences. See Greer, supra note 88, at 715 (describing the basis for the Re-
port’s recommendations); Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1051 (noting the evi-
dentiary argument for reform was the “principal one relied upon” by the 
Committee). Post-PACE arguments included incentivizing justifications. See 
generally Greer, supra note 88, at 716–18 (noting the political debates after 
the enactment of PACE). 
 150. See Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1051 (noting that the evidentiary 
argument is based on the assumption that “[s]ilence . . . is evidence of guilt, 
and should therefore be drawn to the fact finder’s attention”). 
 151. See id. (arguing that “the threat of adverse inferences may encourage 
defendants to testify, and this will provide fact-finders with more information 
than they would otherwise get”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Greer, supra note 88, at 720–23. 
 154. See, e.g., Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1075 (noting the general ad-
verse inference is “quite complex”). Redmayne notes that “there may be inno-
cent explanations for silence,” including that “[a]n innocent defendant may 
worry that he will perform particularly poorly on cross-examination owing to 
being inarticulate or nervous.” Id. Counsel for some defendants may legiti-
mately conclude that the client’s demeanor is itself prejudicial independently 
of the content of the testimony. Cf. id. at 1075–76 (noting that nervousness 
may become prejudicial if the evidence supports such an inference). 
 155. See Greer, supra note 88, at 720 (“Some recent studies have suggested 
that there has been an increase in the number of suspects remaining silent in 
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tive benefits of its proposed reform a weakening of the relation-
ship between counsel and the accused, and the “exchange” right 
it proposes is in effect the “right” of self-incrimination.156 This 
strikes us as a remarkably poor exchange. 
Third, the consequences of unqualified importation of the 
adverse inference to the United States would be far more dire 
than in England and Wales precisely because of the problem 
identified by Making Defendants Speak—the virtually automat-
ic character impeachment by prior convictions.157 “To that ex-
tent,” Redmayne has observed, “Griffin is right.”158 Where Mak-
ing Defendants Speak proposes only a relatively modest 
adjustment to the balancing test for admissibility of prior con-
victions, Redmayne would require such evidence to be disal-
lowed altogether. He concluded that, if “testifying defendants 
[may] be impeached by previous convictions in situations where 
nontestifying defendants would not be, the use of silence as 
evidence is deeply problematic.”159 
B. ACCURACY, PARTICIPATION, AND EQUITY 
We also are skeptical of Making Defendants Speak’s argu-
ment that overruling Griffin is necessary, or even very useful, 
to increase the accuracy of criminal proceedings. If increased 
accuracy is the goal, other means more promising and less bur-
densome on rights are worth exploring. 
Griffin’s scope is limited. It does not constrain govern-
ment’s investigative capacity. It applies only to the small pro-
portion (usually ten percent or fewer) of defendants who actual-
ly go to trial160 and the even smaller number (perhaps fewer 
 
police custody and that this correlates with improved access to legal represen-
tation since the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”). 
 156. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1328–29 (arguing that one “beneficial 
side” of pressuring defendants to testify includes a reduction in dependence on 
lawyers). 
 157. See Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1087–88 (noting that defendants 
may believe taking the stand will lead to impeachment through prior convic-
tions). 
 158. Id. at 1088. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21 (4th ed. 2008) 
(“Typically, no more than 15% of the felony prosecutions reaching the general 
trial court will be resolve by a trial . . . . Setting aside dismissals, and looking 
only to guilty pleas and trials, the ratio of guilty pleas to trials in the general 
trial court typically will exceed ten to one.”); see also GEORGE FISHER, PLEA 
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 98 
(2003) (displaying a table that shows that in the year 1900 only 13% to 14% of 
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than half of those) who do not testify.161 Its only prohibition is 
on the prosecutor’s argument or the judge’s instruction that the 
jury may use the silence of the accused as evidence of guilt and 
its only requirement is that the court give a cautionary instruc-
tion if requested.162 It does not prohibit the prosecutor from 
responding to defense counsel’s argument that the prosecution 
prevented defendant from telling his side of the story,163 or 
from challenging the credibility of defendants who do testify.164 
It does apply at judicial sentencing,165 but not in prison discip-
linary proceedings.166 It is subject to harmless error analysis167 
 
defendants chose trial over a plea bargain in the Middlesex Court of Common 
Pleas). 
 161. According to one survey of 564 responding jurors in Florida, 38.6% re-
ported that the defendant did not testify at trial. Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn 
Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and the Presumption of Innocence: 
In the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 237, 260, 263 (2006); Judge Friendly, an oft-cited critic of the privilege, 
noted the “tremendous proportion of defendants [who] now testify” in stating 
his conclusion not to recommend abandonment of the Griffin rule. Friendly, 
supra note 119, at 700.  
 162. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that “the Fifth 
Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-
inference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so”). 
 163. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31 (1988) (holding that the 
prosecution’s statements “in the light of the comments by defense counsel” did 
not violate the Griffin rule); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595 (1978) (holding 
that the prosecutor did not violate Griffin when he referred to the state’s evi-
dence as “unrefuted” and “uncontradicted” since defense counsel “focused the 
jury’s attention on her silence” by outlining the defense and stating that the 
defendant would testify). 
 164. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73 (2000) (upholding prosecutorial 
comments on testifying defendant’s ability to tailor his testimony after hearing 
other witnesses’ testimony); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) 
(holding that the court impeaching defendant’s testimony through reference to 
a prearrest silence does not violate the Fifth Amendment). 
 165. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (“Where the sen-
tence has not yet been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate fear of ad-
verse consequences from further testimony.”). 
 166. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1976) (“In criminal cases, 
where the stakes are higher and the State’s sole interest is to convict, Griffin 
prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may 
treat the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt. Disciplinary pro-
ceedings in state prisons, however, involve the correctional process and impor-
tant state interests other than conviction for crime. We decline to extend the 
Griffin rule to this context.”). 
 167. Chapman v. United States, 386 U.S. 18, 25 (1967) (reversing convic-
tion after finding error when the prosecutor drew inferences from the defen-
dants silence to not be harmless). Also, note that the Court did not apply Grif-
fin retroactively. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 
(1966). 
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and, according to one study, Griffin reversals are rare.168 
Whether overruling Griffin will meaningfully increase the in-
stance of defendant testimony is at best uncertain.169 And, for 
those defendants who continue to insist on remaining silent in 
a post-Griffin world, the marginal gain in accuracy of those 
verdicts depends on the evidential value of the adverse infe-
rence, which as mentioned above is probably not uniform across 
cases.170 
We also suspect that anti-Griffin arguments have over-
stated the need for, and accuracy-promoting benefits of, defen-
dants’ testimony. The dissenters in neither Griffin nor Mitchell 
complained about the loss of testimonial resources.171 There is 
little reason to believe that overruling Griffin will increase the 
rate of pretrial confessions, so the main incentivizing effect, if 
any, will likely be to increase the rate of perjurious testimony 
(especially if Making Defendants Speak’s recommendation to 
abolish perjury enhancements172 is adopted), which hardly 
seems an optimal way to promote accuracy.173 Overruling Grif-
 
 168. Laurie L. Levenson, “Griffin” Errors, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 4, 2008, at 13 
(finding that courts are reluctant to reverse a conviction unless there are egre-
gious circumstances such as a prosecutor making “deliberate, not isolated” 
statements). 
 169. For discussion of the difficulties in making the empirical case for in-
centivization, see Greer, supra note 88, at 720–23 (describing studies of 
changes in the number of suspects remaining silent during police interroga-
tion after enactment of PACE). 
 170. See supra notes 139–54 and accompanying text. 
 171. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332–33 (1999) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (stressing the historical tradition that contrasts with the Griffin rule 
and the strong intuitive inferences that are naturally drawn from silence); 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 621–22 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(finding no disadvantage for the defendant with a prosecutorial comment ver-
sus “a court which permitted no comment at all” because it allows a “means of 
articulating and bringing into the light of rational discussion a fact inescapa-
bly impressed on the jury’s consciousness”). 
 172. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1329 (“[C]ourts should not impose 
perjury enhancements based on a defendant’s trial testimony.”). 
 173. Making Defendants Speak cites Olin Guy Wellborn III for the proposi-
tion that jurors do have “some ability to assess truthfulness based on the con-
tent of a witness’s statement” as opposed to demeanor. Sampsell-Jones, supra 
note 1, at 1333 (citing Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1075, 1100–01 (1991)) (emphasis added). One obvious problem with this posi-
tion is that, unlike experiments, jury trials do not isolate those two conditions. 
Jurors are confronted with both demeanor and content evidence. In fact, in the 
one study Wellborn cited for the content/demeanor distinction, researchers 
asked participants which cues they looked to in evaluating credibility. Well-
born, supra, at 1084. The participants “cited mostly nonverbal cues”—that is, 
unreliable demeanor evidence. Id. at 1084–85. Making Defendants Speak also 
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fin may also have the blunt-instrument effect of increasing the 
attribution of guilt to the silent defendant whether logically 
warranted or not. The rate of such attribution apparently is al-
ready high,174 as is the rate of misallocation of the burden of 
proof.175 The remedy here would seem to be more clearly stated 
jury instructions, not a dilution of Griffin’s protections.176 
In our view, Making Defendants Speak would take matters 
in the wrong direction. A much more promising set of reforms 
would seek to reduce reliance on confessions and potentially 
problematic defense testimony at trial and increase the availa-
bility and validity of other forms of evidence—both scientific 
and nonscientific. One need not have succumbed to the “CSI Ef-
fect”177 to recognize that developments in forensic technologies 
over the past several decades already have begun to offer some 
forms of scientific evidence far more reliable than confession 
 
claims “optimism” about jurors’ ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. 
Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1333–34 (citing Bella M. DePaulo et al., The 
Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 347 (1997)). DePaulo’s paper, however, is a meta-
analysis of the literature concerning the relationship between confidence in 
one’s judgments about truthfulness and the accuracy of those judgments, and 
identifying moderators of that relationship. DePaulo, supra, at 346. As ex-
pected, “people’s confidence in their judgments of whether another person is 
telling the truth or lying is not significantly related to the accuracy of those 
judgments.” Id. at 353. Regarding the global issue of deception detection, De-
Paulo says, “[d]ozens of studies of the communication of deception provide 
compelling evidence that people are not very skilled at distinguishing when 
others are lying from when they are telling the truth.” Id. at 346. The bias 
tends toward overconfidence: “[c]onfidence is not just uncorrelated with accu-
racy, it is sometimes substantially greater than accuracy.” Id. at 354. In other 
words, “[d]eception detection is a very difficult task” at which people generally 
do only slightly better than chance, yet in which people tend to overestimate 
their accuracy. Id. at 346. 
 174. See Frank & Broschard, supra note 161, at 259–61 (showing a survey 
where at least one out of five jurors disagreed with the fundamental protec-
tion). 
 175. See id. at 263–69 (finding that jurors, despite the court informing 
them multiple times of the burden of proof, often consider a defendant’s si-
lence in their deliberation). 
 176. See id. at 282 (“Jurors cannot, except by accident, follow their instruc-
tions unless they first understand them.”). 
 177. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing 
Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1050 (2006) 
(“The ‘CSI effect’ is a term that legal authorities and the mass media have 
coined to describe a supposed influence that watching the television show CSI: 
Crime Scene Investigation has on juror behavior. Some have claimed that ju-
rors who see the high-quality forensic evidence presented on CSI raise their 
standards in real trials, in which actual evidence is typically more flawed and 
uncertain.”). 
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evidence.178 For others, to be sure, acceptable levels of scientific 
validity have yet to be achieved, and most forensic science is 
dependent on the integrity of the protocols in the laboratories 
that process it.179 But much greater gains in accuracy are likely 
to be had by directly addressing these problems, as recently 
recommended by the National Academies of Science,180 than by 
overruling Griffin. With respect to other, nonscientific evi-
dence—e.g., eyewitness evidence—there already is a rich and 
growing literature regarding a number of investigative and le-
gal reforms which, if implemented, would increase accuracy at 
trial.181 
Finally, we reply briefly to Making Defendants Speak’s 
provocative suggestion that its rights-abolition proposal bene-
fits defendants (the “participation, legitimacy, and equity” ar-
guments182). Its proposal seeks to “punish” defendants for exer-
cising their constitutional right to remain silent at trial by 
 
 178. Kenworthey Bilz, Self-Incrimination Doctrine is Dead; Long Live Self-
Incrimination Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, and the Anxieties of 
the Liberal State, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 867–68 (2008) (concluding that 
scientific evidence will continually improve until it becomes stronger than con-
fessional self-incriminating evidence). 
 179. For an overview of the shortcomings within parts of the forensic 
science community, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 109–10, 214 
(2009) (detailing how disparities in funding and the lack of governance across 
the forensic science community—particularly to produce standardized metho-
dologies and procedures for certification and accreditation—throw the general 
reliability of forensic science evidence at trial into question). The Court recog-
nized some of the concerns with forensic science in Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009), an opinion that strengthened rather 
than weakened the adversary system. 
 180. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 179, 
at 214–15. 
 181. For an excellent resource for eyewitness evidence issues, see Gary 
Wells’s Homepage, http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/ (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2009). For an overview, see Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the De-
partment of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 
U. ARK. L. REV. 231, 234, 236–37 (2000) (discussing the Department of Jus-
tice’s attempt to deal with mistaken eyewitness identifications by creating 
guidelines and recommendations for lineup procedures); Gary L. Wells & Eliz-
abeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 278, 280–
84 (2003) (revealing factors that affect eyewitness identification such as age, 
environment, and confidence and discussing their importance); see also Ri-
chard S. Schmechel et al., 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 192 (2006) (studying and 
discussing the average juror’s lack of knowledge concerning the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony). See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN 
THE LAW 369, 391 (2002) (reviewing the scientific and legal issues surrounding 
eyewitness identification). 
 182. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1334–38. 
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empowering prosecutors to crow to juries about it (as the prose-
cutor in Griffin did) and thereby to pressure defendants into 
enduring the hazards of testimony and cross-examination while 
deliberately seeking to distance them from their counsel.183 We 
fail to see how such results would enhance defendants’ percep-
tion of the legitimacy and fairness of the process. The restora-
tive justice literature cited in Making Defendants Speak184—a 
mode of corrections that involves diversion from the adversary 
arena of court to arguably less dehumanizing, nonadversarial, 
nonpunitive processes—does not support such a proposition.185 
Nor does the Procedural Justice in Felony Cases study by Jona-
than Casper and colleagues cited in Making Defendants 
Speak.186 That study included items tapping the dimensions of 
defendants’ sense of having the opportunity to express them-
selves in the process and interactions with counsel.187 Indeed, 
the Casper study failed to find a relationship between a sense 
of procedural justice and the mode of conviction (that is, wheth-
er convicted by guilty plea or by trial), but did find that “the 
amount of time spent with the lawyer is positively related to 
reports of procedural fairness.”188 
Erica Hashimoto’s study of pro se felony defendants, also 
cited in Making Defendants Speak,189 plainly does not support 
the notion that pressuring defendants into distancing them-
 
 183. Id. at 1337 (arguing that defendants would have better results if they 
represented themselves and avoided “lower quality representation”). 
 184. Id. at 1335–36. 
 185. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, 
and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in 
the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
553, 565 (2007) (failing to find that restorative justice [RJ] procedures more 
successfully motivated adults to follow the law, but finding that RJ procedure 
participants, as opposed to the traditional court trial, indicated that the law 
was legitimate and that reoffending would create greater interpersonal prob-
lems); see also Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research 
on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 
182–86 (2003) (finding limited support for the conclusion that participants in 
RJ programs were slightly more likely to believe they had been able to tell 
their side of the story and to have their opinions adequately considered than 
participants in court). 
 186. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1335 n.40. 
 187. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 483, 484 (1988) (evaluating the influence of factors such as pre-
trial detention, plea bargaining, and other variables on the defendant’s satis-
faction). 
 188. Id. at 497–98 (emphasis added). 
 189. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1335 n.40. 
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selves from counsel is good for them.190 Hers is a carefully qual-
ified defense of Faretta,191 not an assault on Gideon.192 To the 
contrary, she explicitly warns, “[t]hat this small, self-selected 
group who choose self-representation has met with adequate 
results does not mean that all felony defendants, including 
those who reject self-representation, would fare as well if forced 
to navigate the criminal justice system without the aid of coun-
sel. Thus, the right to counsel remains as important as when 
the Court decided Gideon.”193 And, in our view, the solution to 
the very real problem of inadequate defense counsel and 
wealth-based disparities in representation is hardly the Harri-
son Bergeron-type approach of lowering the ceiling proposed by 
Making Defendants Speak194—decreasing defendants’ reliance 
on counsel by pressuring them to testify at trial. A more con-
structive approach is to look for ways to raise the floor.195 
  CONCLUSION   
Making Defendants Speak complains that Griffin, like oth-
er Warren Court decisions in related areas, “lacked cogency and 
analytical rigor.”196 It argues that if Griffin were to be over-
ruled so that defendants might be made to speak, we would al-
so improve accuracy in the judicial fact-finding process, and 
enhance its legitimacy by encouraging defendants’ direct par-
ticipation in their trials.197 Its more general project seems to be 
not only to overrule Griffin, but to dilute the defendant’s posi-
tion in the adversary system and to empower the government 
by “allow[ing] prosecutors to argue adverse inferences from a 
 
 190. Erica H. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An 
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 487 
(2007) (“[T]he right of self-representation in fact serves a vital role in protect-
ing the rights of criminal defendants.”). 
 191. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding that defen-
dants have the right to conduct their own defense). 
 192. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 193. Hashimoto, supra note 190, at 478. 
 194. KURT VONNEGUT, JR., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MON-
KEY HOUSE 7–14 (1998).  
 195. For proposed reform based on advocacy norms of the standards for in-
effective assistance of counsel, see Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, 
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 64 (1986) (advocating that the standard for effec-
tive counsel should be based on the concepts of due process and equal protec-
tion). 
 196. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1342. 
 197. Id. at 1329–30. 
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defendant’s silence”198 and by “reduc[ing] dependence on law-
yers.”199 To establish a doctrinal foundation for this result, the 
article asserts that a criminal trial is a “zero-sum,”200 “sorting 
process” game.201 Thus stated, it becomes merely a matter of 
adjusting the equation to bring about the desired outcome. Two 
sets of reforms, two sets of adjustments to the judicial equation, 
will make defendants speak: allow (even invite) inferences of 
guilt from silence to punish defendants who choose to remain 
silent; restrict the relevance of prior convictions as impeach-
ment evidence and abolish obstruction-of-justice sentencing 
guidelines enhancements to reward defendants who choose to 
testify.  
We have briefly noted why we believe Making Defendants 
Speak’s purported benefits are illusory, but have concentrated 
mainly on explaining why we do not share its apparent antipa-
thy to the right to silence at trial. Griffin, like other opinions by 
Justice Douglas late in his career, is vulnerable to criticism as 
poor judicial craftsmanship,202 but we believe its principle is 
sound. To be sure, that principle did not enjoy much currency 
among the founders and it has been subject to continued aca-
demic criticism. Nevertheless, the no-adverse-inference rule 
and the right to silence at trial it helps to effectuate have come 
to be an integral part of an interrelated set of protections, aris-
ing within an increasingly complex and intrusive criminal jus-
tice system. Those protections accord a modicum of dignity we 
believe most persons deserve when confronted by an inhuman 
and powerful adversary in a dehumanizing process. Those pro-
tections recognize the central role of counsel as “a medium be-
tween the accused and the power of the State.”203 Today’s “test 
the prosecution,” anti-inquisitorial model of criminal justice has 
developed within an ever-burgeoning substantive criminal law 
and law enforcement system. The particular rights at issue 
here—the right to silence at trial and Griffin’s more specific 
prohibition on the evidentiary use of its nonexercise against the 
accused—is by now a well-established part of the cluster of 
 
 198. Id. at 1329. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1328. 
 201. Id. at 1330. 
 202. See Melvin I. Urofsky, William O. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 
41 DUKE L.J. 133, 134 (1991) (“William O. Douglas remains a figure sur-
rounded by controversies concerned with his jurisprudence or lack of it.”). 
 203. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2098 (2009) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
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rights that define the model. That cluster may not look like it 
did in the founders’ era, but then neither does much that mat-
ters about the practical, day-to-day face of our criminal law and 
criminal justice system.204  
 
 
 204. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (recognizing that 
“[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater freedom”). 
